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Abstract  
 
The proliferation of legal and normative standards regulating women’s rights in conflict 
has been accompanied by concerns about their efficacy. The article examines the 
activities of the CEDAW Committee and the UN Security Council and considers how 
synergies might be advanced. The article finds that, while the Security Council has 
unique authority over UN system activities, sanctions and peacekeeping, the CEDAW 
Committee – as a human rights treaty monitoring body – possesses the more effective 
system of state accountability and the more robust commitment to women’s equality and 
rights. The article proposes measures for the optimum interaction between both 
institutions in order to maximise overall accountability for women’s rights in conflict.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Given the formerly prevailing ‘silence’ of international law on women’s status and rights 
in armed conflict,1 the proliferation of legal standards and obligations in recent years 
offers promise. On October 30, 2013, for example, the monitoring body (the 
‘Committee’) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (‘the Convention’) adopted General Recommendation Number 30 
(GR30) on the rights of women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict 
situations.2  On the same day, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 
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2 Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ‘General 
Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-conflict situations’ (18 
October 2013) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/30 [hereafter GR30].  
 resolution 2122 on women’s leadership in peacebuilding.3 This was the eighth resolution 
under its Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, inaugurated in 2000 by the 
adoption of Resolution 1325.4 We can now credibly point to a corpus of international law 
regulating the treatment of women in armed conflict. This is attributable to a considerable 
growth in the activity of feminist lawyers, diplomats and pressure groups in response to 
the practical needs of specialisation around the treatment of women in conflict-affected 
settings. It evidences a recognition that, to quote Judge Weeramantry’s dissent in the 
Nuclear Weapons case, ‘complex problems have ramifications in many specialized 
directions’. 5  The challenge of guaranteeing women’s rights in conflict is indeed a 
complex one.  
That two regimes of international law are now engaged in the same thematic area 
is, of course, not unique to women’s rights in conflict. The increase in overlapping 
standards and obligations created by the monitoring and interpretative activities of the 
CEDAW Committee and the development of WPS resolutions by the UNSC is an 
example of much broader trends in the diversification and expansion of international law. 
The view of the International Law Commission is that such fragmentation ‘create[s] the 
danger of conflicting and incompatible rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional 
practices’.6 The phenomenon has given rise to significant scholarly concern and doctrinal 
efforts to determine primacy in the context of overlapping international norms. While the 
operation of both the Convention and the WPS agenda has generated extensive scholarly 
engagement, specific feminist consideration of fragmentation in international law per se 
has been notably sparse.7 The specific institutional implications of manifold overlapping 
gender equality norms and obligations in international law is, therefore, under-examined.  
Initial feminist interventions into the field of international law identified a 
‘masculine world’, with reinforcing organisational and normative structural factors that 
                                                 
3 UNSC Res 2122 (2013) S/RES2122/2013.  
4 UNSC Res 1325 (2000) S/RES1325/2000. 
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 excluded women from its practice and women’s lives from its areas of concern.8 By 
contrast, contemporary regime activity concerning women’s rights in conflict engages 
international human rights law and the UNSC. In addition, states have agreed to limit the 
lawful conduct of armed conflict – including against female combatants and civilians – 
under international humanitarian law9 and, under international criminal law, established 
international criminal jurisdiction over individuals bearing greatest responsibility for the 
most serious violations of these laws.10 The relevant laws were developed at different 
times by different groups of states. They are motivated by divergent priorities and 
implemented by separate institutions with widely varying powers of monitoring and 
enforcement. The contemporary domain, with its tapestry of normative and legal 
commitments across regimes of international law, therefore posits a more subtle and 
complex set of challenges for feminist analysis. In a relatively rare intervention on the 
theme of fragmentation, Ní Aoláin has sounded a feminist doctrinal alarm that increase in 
attention to the WPS agenda by advocates and state actors has de-prioritised monitoring 
and compliance with human rights obligations. This de-prioritisation is reflected in 
particular, she argues, with respect to obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.11 Charlesworth and Chinkin question the efficacy 
of vastly increased normative activity addressing women in armed conflict; they express 
concerns about progress being more ostensible than real.12 Aligned to such concerns, 
feminist doctrinal critique about the overwhelmingly ‘soft’ nature of feminist-informed 
developments in international law has a comparatively long lineage.13 More broadly, 
feminist work that implicates fragmentation in international law belongs to more 
fundamental feminist questioning of positing ‘more or better law’ as the solution to 
complex social and political problems of gender inequality.  
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 This article takes as its focus the interaction between the Convention and the 
UNSC WPS resolutions for a number of linked reasons. Firstly, the pursuit of productive 
interactions between the Convention the UNSC WPS activities has received significant 
political and policy impetus in recent years. It was inaugurated initially by the CEDAW 
Committee’s landmark GR30, which expressly addresses the relationship between the 
Convention and the WPS Resolutions. In response, UN Women, the entity leading the 
UN’s policy and programming on women’s rights, commissioned a Guidebook for states 
and civil society on the General Recommendation and its relationship to the WPS 
resolutions.14 Together, these initiatives informed a broadening of relevant civil society 
activity, with considerable evidence of the WPS advocacy community taking greater 
interest in the Convention procedures.15 Further, the United Nations 2015 Global Study 
on the Implementation of Resolution 1325 dedicated a full chapter to the issue of 
‘linkages between human rights mechanisms and the UNSC resolutions on Women, 
Peace and Security’ and made specific recommendations concerning the need for 
improved synergies between the two.16 In December 2016 an ‘Arria Formula Meeting on 
Linkages between UNSC Resolution 1325 and CEDAW General Recommendation 
Number 30’ was held between the UNSC and members of the CEDAW Committee in the 
UN Headquarters in New York. 17  Together, these policy, political and advocacy 
developments signal very significant interest in current and potential interactions between 
the Convention and the WPS resolutions. In addition to contributing to broader scholarly 
analysis of fragmentation, this article seeks to inform contemporary debates in policy and 
practice by offering the first extended scholarly treatment of the interactions between the 
Convention and the WPS resolutions on the issue of women’s rights in conflict.  
This article is unique in its focus on the practical and institutional question of 
whether and how the Convention and WPS activities – and their interactions – advance 
accountability under international law for the rights of women in conflict. We therefore 
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16 United Nations (2015). Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study 
on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325. New York. 346-366  
17  On ‘arria formula’ meetings, see further: United Nations (2012) The Security Council: Working Methods 
Handbook. New York. 80-89 
 follow the ‘institutional perspective’ of Young and others,18 by considering the functional 
strengths of institutional activity on women’s rights in conflict under the CEDAW 
Committee – as an institution of international human rights law – and the UNSC, 
respectively. The article provides the first systematic review of both CEDAW Committee 
activities on women’s rights in conflict and the procedural workings of the UNSC’s WPS 
activities.  Further, we consider the practical incidences of interaction between the 
institutions. The analysis extends to a consideration of how the CEDAW Committee and 
UNSC should interact in order to maximise accountability for women’s rights in conflict.  
The priorities that motivate our inquiry are twofold. Firstly, from an institutional 
perspective, we explore the extent to which progressive normative development on 
women’s rights in conflict is accompanied by meaningful accountability. Concerns about 
accountability emerge from the shadowy legal status attached to the normative 
developments in question. This is a familiar problem to feminists working in the terrain 
of public international law.19 While the CEDAW Committee operates – uniquely – as an 
independent group of experts in women’s human rights contributing to treaty monitoring 
and interpretation, it operates at one  remove from state consent. The UNSC is not a 
representative body and, as a result, any legislative or quasi-legislative action can lack 
legitimacy and acceptability to non-members.20 Further, the UNSC’s authority to engage 
in law-making activity is highly contested.21 Nevertheless, since 1990, the UNSC has 
been found to increasingly engage in this manner of law-making and norm 
development.22 It has done so without any accompanying system for maintaining broad 
accountability from UN member states.  
Secondly, we consider ways to counter the thematic narrowing of women’s rights 
in conflict, given evidence of increasing securitisation of women’s rights emerging from 
the UNSC’s WPS agenda.23 Women’s rights issues—such as violence against women—
have become defined and addressed according to the UNSC’s mandate to maintain 
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 international peace and security, rather than in line with the experiences of women and 
girls and the fulfilment of their rights.24 Further, whereas the CEDAW Committee has 
adopted a broad understanding of ‘conflict’—which includes protracted and low-intensity 
civil strife, ethnic and communal violence and states of emergency25—the UNSC has 
largely resisted such a broad definition, with some permanent members arguing that the 
WPS resolutions apply only to the country situations on the agenda of the UNSC.26 In 
order to counter thematic narrowing of women’s rights in conflict, we see potential in the 
women’s human rights mandate of the CEDAW Committee. The institutional and 
thematic challenges combine to give greater urgency to efforts to enhance the relationship 
between both institutions.  
We argue that, while the CEDAW Committee is singularly capable of pursuing 
meaningful state accountability within a human rights framework, the UNSC has unique 
capacities in respect of UN system activities, and multilateral responses to threats to 
international peace and security, such as UN peacekeeping, addressing non-state actors, a 
sanctions regime and country-specific resolutions. The article begins by mapping the 
emergence of institutional activity on the thematic area of women’s rights in conflict 
within both the CEDAW Committee and the UNSC. It reviews the accountability 
mechanisms and activity to date on women’s rights in conflict within the respective 
institutions. The article considers the current institutional interactions between the 
CEDAW Committee, and the UNSC on women’s rights in conflict and how this 
relationship might be enhanced to improve the overall accountability for women’s rights 
in conflict. The article argues that there are opportunities for improved complementarity 
between the CEDAW Committee, as an institution of the human rights system, and the 
UNSC. The article concludes that this complementarity is best pursued through ongoing 
processes of cross-regime dialogue, to facilitate practical cooperation, and inter-regime 
accountability, in which each regime seeks to hold the other to account for its activities 
on women’s rights in conflict.  
 
                                                 
24 D Otto, 'The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law over the Last Decade' 
(2009) 10 Melbourne J of Intl L 11. 
25 GR30 (n 2) para 4.  
26 See further text at (nn 95,151-153). 
 II. THE EMERGENCE OF FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITY ON 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 
Thematic activity on women’s rights in conflict has emerged from both the CEDAW 
Committee and the UNSC, though not contemporaneously. The divergent timelines 
reflect differences in the institutional mandates between the UNSC and other organs of 
the UN. The relatively late arrival of the UNSC to the issue of women’s rights in conflict, 
as compared to the CEDAW Committee, can be attributed to a number of linked factors 
that this section discusses in depth.   
 
A. The CEDAW Committee and Women’s Rights in Conflict 
The breadth of the contemporary CEDAW Committee’s activity on women’s rights in 
conflict was not necessarily to be predicted from its institutional origins in the UN human 
rights system. The UN’s human rights activity emerges principally from article 1 of the 
UN Charter, which lists ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’ as one of 
the foundational objectives of the institution.27 In terms of the allocation of institutional 
responsibility for the implementation of these actions and objectives, the Charter 
envisages a role for the General Assembly in commissioning studies and making 
recommendations to assist in the realisation of human rights.28 It also envisages a lead 
institutional role for the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to make and initiate 
studies and recommendations, 29  but also critically to set up commissions ‘for the 
promotion of human rights’.30 From this latter ostensibly modest provision, an expansive 
institutional architecture for the protection and promotion of human rights has emerged. 
The critical early development for the protection of women’s human rights was the 
ECOSOC resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights, to lead 
intergovernmental developments on human rights, and the Commission on the Status of 
Women, to lead intergovernmental developments on women’s equality.31 These distinct 
                                                 
27  Charter of the UN, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Further, articles 55 and 56 pledge member states to 
take cooperative action to promote universal respect and observance of human rights. 
28 ibid article 13(1). This should be read as complementary to its article 10 mandate to discuss any matter 
dealt with by the Charter and to make recommendations to states.  
29 Charter of the UN (n 27) Article 63.  
30 ibid Article 68. 
31  ECOSOC resolution establishing the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommission on the 
Status of Women, ECOSOC Res 11 (21 June 1946) UN Doc E/RES/2/11.  
 elements of the human rights system cooperate in the development and adoption of 
treaties for the enhanced protection of human rights.  
The idea of a women’s rights treaty was given initial institutional impetus by the 
General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in 
1967.32 The working draft of the treaty emerged firstly from the Commission on the 
Status of Women, was further scrutinised by the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly (Social Affairs) and was ultimately adopted and opened for signature by 
resolution of the General Assembly.33 The adoption of the Convention in 1979 signalled 
an important acknowledgement by the international community, and more particularly by 
the UN human rights system, of the deficiencies of the so-called ‘mainstream’ human 
rights instruments to protect and promote the rights of women.34 The novelty of the 
Convention lay in its specificity to the lives of women and its transcendence of the 
boundaries traditionally established by human rights treaties, in particular between public 
and private spheres.35 Much more than its symbolic importance, however, the entry into 
force of the Convention in 1981 established a treaty-based system of state 
accountability36 for an enumerated list of women’s human rights, involving a periodic 
review of state compliance37 by an independent committee of experts.38 The Committee 
has established itself as the key institution advancing feminist-informed normative and 
legal developments on women’s rights under international law.39 
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 The Convention does not specify its application to armed conflict—in contrast, 
for example, to the Convention on the Rights of the Child.40 Further, its provisions do not 
specifically address the needs and rights of women that prevail in conflict-affected 
settings. Nevertheless, the Convention does not permit derogations and the Committee 
has consistently affirmed the Convention’s application to conflict, civil strife and public 
emergency.41 The adoption by the Committee of GR30 on the rights of women in conflict 
prevention, conflict and postconflict situations therefore arose from the recognized 
silences of the Convention in specifically addressing challenges to women’s rights in 
such settings.42 The bulk of the GR30 is dedicated to articulating the ways in which the 
rights guaranteed under the Convention are impacted by conflict, specifically the 
prohibition of discrimination in law, policy and custom;43 the obligation on states to 
challenge discriminatory social and cultural patterns;44 the prohibition on trafficking;45 
the right to political participation in domestic and international affairs; 46  access to 
education, employment, health;47 and the rights of rural women;48 right to nationality;49 
right to equality in marriage and family relations;50 and the right to enter into contracts.51 
GR30 notes the consequent obligations on states to remedy violations caused by conflict 
and makes several recommendations to states parties to this end.52  
While GR30 now constitutes an authoritative statement of women’s human rights 
in conflict, there are clear limitations to the Committee’s traction over, firstly and most 
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 clearly, UN member states that have declined to ratify the Convention.53 Such states are 
small in number, yet they include some significant actors in armed conflict and women’s 
rights—most notably the United States, but also Iran and Somalia. The CEDAW 
Committee’s oversight procedures have no bearing on these states and their conduct of 
hostilities domestically or internationally. The structural weaknesses historically 
associated with the Convention, due to the lack of any associated enforcement 
procedures, have been ameliorated in important ways through the entry into force of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention in December 2000, which established an individual 
communications mechanism 54  and an inquiry procedure to investigate ‘grave or 
systematic violations’ of the Convention. 55  Nevertheless, these enhanced monitoring 
procedures are likewise limited to state parties to the Optional Protocol, which remains 
well behind the number of state parties to the Convention.56  
The accountability activities of the Committee encounter further grave restrictions 
imposed by widespread reservations to the Convention. 57  The Convention bears the 
unfortunate distinction of being the human rights treaty subject to the largest number of 
reservations by ratifying states. According to Charlesworth and Chinkin, ‘some states 
have used the reservation mechanism effectively to hollow out the heart of their formal 
obligations’.58 These widespread reservations likewise erode the Committee’s capacity to 
effectively monitor and enforce the Convention’s protections of women’s rights in 
conflict against all state parties. An additional obstacle to the activities of the Committee 
in respect of state parties and their protection of women’s rights in conflict is the ‘soft 
law’ status of GR30. While general recommendations form an important element of the 
Committee’s normative and interpretative role, they only have persuasive status under 
                                                 
53 At the time of writing, there are 189 state parties to the Convention. 
54 Article 2. 
55 Article 8. 
56 At the time of writing, there are 107 state parties to the instrument. 
57  See generally R Cook, 'Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination of Women' (1990) 30 Virginia J of Intl L 643. 
58 H Charlesworth and C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 113. 
 international law and, as such, face resistance to their strict application by some state 
parties.59  
Beyond the challenge of non-ratifying UN member states, or ‘insincere’ state 
parties,60 the Convention is also limited by its strict application to states only. While 
states are the central actors of any regime of international law, the practice of 
international peace and security proceeds largely through organs and actors that do not 
constitute member states in a strict sense. The multilateral activities of the United Nations 
derive their legal authority from the consent of all member states to the UN Charter. In 
practical terms, many of the UN’s activities on women’s rights in conflict take place 
through dedicated UN programmes and agencies, operating globally and, in some 
instances, at country-level. The CEDAW Committee is thus able to establish a measure 
of accountability over some UN programmatic activity in countries under periodic 
examination. (In practice, the Committee has used its monitoring procedures not only in 
relation to state parties but also, as appropriate, in relation to UN specialised agencies and 
UN country teams 61 ). Nevertheless, such monitoring is partial, not public and is 
dependent on tradition and goodwill, rather than strict legal obligation.62 Broader UN 
programmatic activity on peace and security, such as the work of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, and political decision-making, such as by the UNSC or General Assembly, 
is effectively shielded from CEDAW Committee’s system of state accountability. While 
the Committee has interpreted the Convention to include obligations on state parties in 
their multilateral activities on peace and security,63 such an approach cannot provide 
adequate capture of intergovernmental political and programmatic activities on women’s 
rights in conflict.  Given the importance of activity and decision-making at 
                                                 
59  There is an extensive literature addressing the legal status of so-called ‘soft law’, such as general 
recommendations. For a feminist scholarly treatment of this debate, see for example C Chinkin,  (1989). 
‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ 38 ICLQ 850; H 
Charlesworth, ‘Law-making and sources’ in J Crawford and M Koskenniemi (eds) The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law (CUP 2012) 187-202. 
60 B Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics (CUP 2009) 77.  
  
61 While these reports are confidential, their outline contents are set out in UNICEF, CEDAW and the 
Reporting Process to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: A Guide for 
UNICEF Field Staff (Division of Policy and Practice, March 2009), Annex 9:  Guidelines for UN Country 
Team reports to the CEDAW Committee, 104.  
62 It is addressed in GR30 (n 2) paras 84-85.   
63 ibid para 82.   
 intergovernmental level to the treatment of women’s rights in conflict, this is not an 
inconsequential gap. 
 
B. The UNSC and Women’s Rights in Conflict  
Typically regarded as the UN organ that is most militaristic and driven by global power 
politics, the UNSC is not formally attributed a role in advancing human rights by the UN 
Charter.64 Rather, the UNSC has the responsibility to weigh the evidence in individual 
circumstances and to identify threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression.65 In determining the appropriate response to situations on its agenda, the 
UNSC can choose between its recommendatory powers under Chapter VI for the ‘Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes’ or its binding powers under Chapter VII for ‘Action with Respect 
to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’. Envisaged as the 
enforcement body of the United Nations, the UNSC has unique authority to make binding 
decisions66 and extraordinary powers that include the authorisation of the use of force.67 
Those extraordinary powers reflect the primary mandate of the organ, namely ‘the 
maintenance of international peace and security’.68  
The UN Charter’s preambular and article 1 commitments to ‘promote and 
encourage respect for human rights’ imply a role for all UN organs. Moreover, human 
rights violations of sufficient severity can themselves constitute threats to international 
peace and security.69 These Charter provisions have been the subject of highly varying 
interpretation by the UNSC during the seven decades of its operation.70 While ‘the UNSC 
                                                 
64 Charter of the UN (n 27) Chapter V.  
65 ibid article 39. See generally ibid, Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of 
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. 
66 ibid article 25.    
67 ibid.  
68 ibid, article 24(1).   
69 For example, in UNSC Res 1366 (2001) OP 10, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General:  
[T]o refer to the Council information and analyses from within the United Nations system on cases 
of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human 
rights law and on potential conflict situations arising, inter alia, from ethnic, religious and 
territorial disputes, poverty and lack of development and expresses its determination to give 
serious consideration to such information and analyses regarding situations which it deems to 
represent a threat to international peace and security’. 
70 See generally SD Bailey, The UN Security Council and Human Rights (St Martin’s Press 1994); JG and 
BS Ugarte, The UNSC in the Age of Human Rights (CUP 2014). 
 was not intended as a forum to debate and devise solutions to human rights issues’,71 it 
first acknowledged that the systematic violation of rights could constitute an issue of 
international peace and security in the 1960s.72 A growing, if indirect, role on human 
rights relevant to its mandate began to develop in the 1990s.73 The end of the Cold War 
brought a new era of human rights across the wider UN system,74 and with it increasing 
scrutiny of the UNSC and its legitimacy, including calls for the UNSC to reform, to 
democratise and to address the impact on human rights of its own operations.75 These 
calls for reform overlapped with a feminist spotlight on rights violations impacting 
women in conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and calls for a re-focus 
by the UNSC on the people affected by conflict and by its operations.76  
Developments in the UN more broadly in the 1990s also had an important impact 
on the UNSC agenda. The UN Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development 
Report introduced the concept of ‘human security’ to the UN, which re-located the idea 
of global security situated in arms and state-centric concerns to that located in all aspects 
of human development.77 While the concept of human security has experienced varying 
degrees of legitimacy itself since, and its conceptual emergence may be critiqued for the 
omission of gender or feminist concerns,78 it nevertheless provided an entry point for 
feminist activism and for the increasing adoption of thematic resolutions by the UNSC (a 
clear avenue through which it makes the connect with broader human rights-related 
issues).79  
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72 BS Ugarte and J Genser, ‘Evolution of the Security Council’s Engagement on Human Rights’ in BS 
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73 ibid 5-6. 
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75  D Otto, ‘Securing the “Gender Legitimacy” of the UN Security Council: Prising Gender from its 
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thematic-focused resolutions. Prior to this, from the creation of the Council in 1946 to the adoption of 
 The UNSC made a first ambitious step towards embedding women’s rights in 
conflict within its agenda by issuing a press release on 8 March 2000, on the occasion of 
International Women’s Day, declaring that ‘members of the UNSC recognize that peace 
is inextricably linked with equality between women and men’.80 A series of further steps 
included an arria formula,81 an open debate on women, peace and security and finally the 
adoption of resolution 1325 in October 2000.82 The resolution provides for four principal 
pillars of priority action in which women’s rights should be advanced, namely: 
Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief and Recovery. The resolution is widely 
celebrated for its recognition of women’s gender-specific experiences of conflict and of 
women as agents of conflict transformation.83  
As the resolution drew attention for its symbolic importance, practical concerns 
about weak provision for implementation quickly emerged. 84  In response to such 
concerns, seven additional WPS resolutions were adopted. Three focus broadly on 
advancing the women’s participation pillars (resolution 1889 (2009), resolution 2122 
(2013), resolution 2242 (2015)85) and four focus on conflict-related sexual violence 
(CRSV) (resolution 1820 (2008), resolution 1888 (2009), resolution 1960 (2010), 
resolution 2106 (2013)86). These additional resolutions have extended the breadth and 
depth of resolution 1325, made provisions for the implementation of the overall WPS 
agenda and engaged a broad range of member states willing to lead adoption of additional 
resolutions on this issue.  
While the WPS resolutions have signalled important political recognition by the 
UNSC that women’s inequality and rights are concerns of peace and security, a number 
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 of critiques have emerged. Numerous feminist scholars and activists have pointed to 
shortcomings in how the UNSC has engaged with concepts of gender and with the 
discriminations that characterise women’s lives. For example, a central motivation for 
activists in calling for the adoption of Resolution 1325 (2000) was to overcome the 
exclusion of women from decision-making, as well as increasing women’s role in the 
general activities that fall within the remit of the UNSC. In 1993, 1% of deployed 
peacekeeping personnel were women, which has barely increased to 3% by 2014.87 Of 31 
peace agreements signed between 1992 and 2011, only 4 per cent of signatories, 2.4 per 
cent of chief mediators, 3.7 per cent of witnesses and 9 per cent of negotiators were 
women.88 While the resolutions call for the increased participation of women, they are 
absent of language that articulates measures to address the fundamental basis of women’s 
exclusion, namely addressing structural inequalities and gender discrimination.  
There are significant concerns that issues such as women’s participation have 
been engaged with by the UNSC only in as far as they advance the UNSC’s and states’ 
security agendas. 89   For example, the UNSC-mandated 2015 Global Study on the 
Implementation of Resolution 1325 documented concerns among women’s activists 
globally that there are adverse consequences for women’s security when states co-opt the 
work of women’s organisations into state security strategies.90  In particular, with respect 
to the prevention of violent extremism, Resolution 2242 (2015) calls for the participation 
of women and women’s organisations in the development of counter terrorism 
strategies.91 There are fears that the mantle of women’s participation in national security 
will become a means for states to simply interpret participation as a role for women in 
intelligence gathering. 92  Women activists have expressed concerns ‘of women being 
“used” by the government, rather than being empowered to participate fully in society 
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 and overcome the barriers they face’.93 In addition, where states fund women’s rights 
activities as a means to counter radicalism, rather than for the purposes of promoting 
gender equality per se, the perception that these organizations are linked with state 
security strategies can compromise trust and safety within their communities.94  
Compounding these complexities, contestation endures within the UNSC in 
respect of its role vis-à-vis thematic issues such as WPS, their tie to its specific mandate 
and how it engages with these issues relative to the wider human rights system. 95 
Fundamental concerns about the WPS agenda at the UNSC make the investigation of 
alternative and complementary means to advance women’s rights in conflict, such as the 
CEDAW Committee, all the more urgent.   
 
III. INSTITUTION-SPECIFIC ACTIVITY FOR ACCOUNTABILITY ON WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS IN CONFLICT  
A. CEDAW Committee Activity on Women’s Rights in Conflict  
The CEDAW Committee has been an advocate for women’s rights in conflict since long 
before the adoption of either GR30 or the WPS resolutions at the UNSC. As this section 
outlines, despite the noted limitations of the Convention due to reservations and weak 
monitoring procedures, there are grounds for confidence in the Committee’s capacity to 
pursue state accountability for women’s rights in conflict. A review of the Committee’s 
activities to ameliorate the impact of conflict on women’s rights, and to ensure those 
rights are fulfilled through conflict and peacebuilding initiatives, evidences longstanding 
and considered engagement. Both in law and in practice, the Committee’s mechanisms 
for state accountability continue to operate during conflict and civil unrest. The 
Committee has done this through the effective exercise of its four complementary roles, 
namely periodic state monitoring; ‘monitoring-plus’ activities such as issuing special 
‘statements’ and requesting ‘exceptional reports’; norm-development through advancing 
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 feminist-informed interpretation of both the Convention and broader human rights 
commitments; and enhanced monitoring activities through the Optional Protocol. These 
are reviewed here in turn, in addition to a consideration of how such Committee activities 
contribute to women’s rights on the ground in conflict-affected states.  
Most importantly, the Committee conducts the periodic review of state 
compliance with obligations under the Convention. For example, in its monitoring of 
periodic state reporting, the Committee has drawn attention to levels of women’s 
representation in post-conflict democratic institutions 96  and has likewise urged state 
parties to ensure the inclusion of women in ongoing peace processes within state parties’ 
jurisdiction.97 Moreover, the Committee has drawn attention to the impact of conflict on 
substantive rights guaranteed under the Convention, such as the right of women and girls 
to education on a basis of non-discrimination.98 Further, the Committee has enhanced 
these periodic reporting procedures through the activation of what might be termed 
‘monitoring-plus’ activities. These have taken the form of ‘statements’ addressing 
particular women’s human rights situation of concern. 99  Of particular note is the 
Committee’s utilisation of its article 18(1)(b) authority to request state party reports on an 
‘exceptional’ basis, in order to examine information on actual or potential violations 
where there is special cause for concern.100 Interestingly, these ‘exceptional reports’ have 
to date exclusively pertained to conflict-affected state parties, beginning with the 
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 Committee’s 1995 request to countries in the former Yugoslavia to submit reports 
addressing acts of violence against women and girls, including mass rape and rape used 
as a weapon of war.101  
Many commentators have underlined the role that the reporting procedure can 
play in furthering implementation of the Convention’s norms.102 The process of reporting 
focuses governments’ attention on the treaty obligations and requires them to evaluate 
progress. It also provides an opportunity for civil society to engage with government 
during the preparation of the report and the Committee’s review, as well as in following 
up on the Committee’s concluding observations. The reporting procedure provides an 
international forum where the government is on display globally and nationally, and 
provides the occasion for a UN-designated group of experts to make targeted substantive 
recommendations on steps that should be taken to advance women’s equality.103 Thus, 
the CEDAW Committee’s requests for ‘exceptional reports’ in cases of conflict have both 
symbolic and practical significance. In symbolic terms, the request highlights 
international awareness and concern with the gender-specific impact of conflict on 
women’s rights in particular conflict settings. In practical terms, the request requires state 
parties to gather further information, data and evidence concerning the gender-specific 
impact of conflict, which can in turn usefully support local women’s movements in 
seeking amelioration and redress for the most exigent effects of conflict on women.104  
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 Critically, the CEDAW Committee plays a unique role in advancing feminist-
informed interpretations of the treaty’s provisions and, ultimately, in shaping normative 
development of international human rights law. The Committee undertakes this work in 
particular by articulating authoritative interpretations of the Convention through its 
General Recommendations, which have demonstrated growing attention to the specific 
impact of conflict on the enjoyment of rights guaranteed under the Convention. With 
General Recommendation Number 19 (GR19) on violence against women, the 
Committee advanced its first substantive discussion in a general recommendation of the 
impact of conflict on the enjoyment of rights guaranteed under the Convention. 105 
Further, General Recommendation Number 28 (GR28) on the nature of the Convention’s 
obligations on state parties marked the Committee’s clearest statement hitherto that the 
Convention also applies in its entirety to situations of armed conflict.106 This trajectory 
culminated in the adoption of GR30 on women’s rights in conflict. Experience from the 
campaign to recognise violence against women as a human rights violation evidences the 
importance of the CEDAW Committee in articulating and advancing subaltern 
interpretations of human rights obligations that ultimately penetrate the mainstream 
human rights system.107 As Merry observes: ‘Culture is as much present in international 
human rights conferences and UN institutions as in local villages (though typically 
associated only with the latter)’. 108  Normative developments led by the CEDAW 
Committee have been shown to foster broader cultural change within the international 
human rights system.109  
The structural weaknesses historically associated with the Convention, due to the 
lack of enhanced monitoring procedures permitting the Committee to determine 
violations in specific incidences, have been ameliorated in important ways through the 
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 entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention in December 2000. Enhanced 
monitoring activities for conflict-related violations have, to date, been limited. The 
Committee has, however, been consistent in rejecting any claim by states that issues of 
asylum are not addressed by the Convention. 110  In the case of individual petitions 
emerging from conflict-affected settings, where domestic legal systems are likely to be 
debilitated and the ability to gather evidence hampered, future jurisprudence will be 
important in illuminating whether more flexible standards are applied to evidential 
requirements and procedural requirements concerning the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies.. Likewise, the Committee has not yet activated the Optional Protocol’s inquiry 
procedure in order to investigate ‘grave or systematic violations’ of the Convention 
specifically due to conflict. Nevertheless, the clearest strand of activity by the Committee 
in the jurisprudence emerging from the Optional Protocol is violence against women.111 
The consistent line of the Committee’s inquiry activity has been to investigate and hold 
state parties to account for violence against women by non-state actors.112 This latter 
feature, in particular, of the Committee’s enhanced monitoring activities has considerable 
relevance for its likely approach to ‘grave or systematic violations’ occurring in conflict-
affected settings.  
It is clear therefore that the CEDAW Committee has utilized its powers to draw 
attention to the impact of conflict on women’s rights. The ways in which the 
Committee’s activities translate into improved protection of women’s rights on the 
ground has been given extensive academic consideration. Indeed, in their comparative 
study of the relative efficacy of human rights treaties, Englehart and Miller concluded 
that the Convention was even more effective than its counterparts in achieving a 
statistically significant and positive effect on human rights, what they termed ‘the 
CEDAW effect’. 113  The most consistent finding across this scholarship is that the 
CEDAW Committee’s activities are effective domestically where they connect with local 
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 reform constituencies, in particular women’s civil society.114 In the most wide-reaching 
and academically significant of such studies, Beth Simmons concludes that human rights 
treaties’ impacts lie less in their direct relationship with state parties, but rather in the 
mobilizing framework that they offer to domestic reform constituencies.115 Thus, NGO 
use of shadow and communication reporting procedures, and further utilisation of 
Concluding Comments and General Recommendations, has been found to be critical to 
the Committee’s efficacy on the ground.116 Importantly, these conclusions were drawn 
from studies involving both conflict-affected and non-conflict states. One illustrative 
example concerns the CEDAW Committee’s repeated criticism of the UK’s failure to 
include Northern Ireland within its National Action Plan on Women, Peace and 
Security. 117  This consistent attention by the Committee has proven important in 
supporting and sustaining local women’s advocacy for an improved and better-
coordinated state response to the impact of the conflict and its legacy on women’s 
rights.118  
 
B. UNSC Activity on Women, Peace And Security 
The activity and productivity of the UNSC on WPS should be measured not only by its 
prolific adoption of resolutions as outlined, but also by its growing and consistent 
engagement with this agenda through its procedural workings. The UNSC has held an 
annual open debate on WPS since 2002 (with a Presidential Statement delivered in 2001). 
From 2009, this became two WPS open debates per year; one on the WPS agenda 
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 broadly and one focused on its resolutions on conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV).119 
As requested through the WPS resolutions, the Secretary-General presents one annual 
report to the UNSC on WPS broadly. Again, since 2009, the Security-General has 
presented an additional report on CRSV.120 Hosting, attending and advancing a body of 
work required by two debates and two reports per year represents a significant resource 
and time commitment on the part of the UNSC to this agenda item, as well as a 
significant resource commitment from the UN system entities that fulfil these requests. 
While two UNSC members are ‘penholders’ for the agenda (UK for WPS broadly, US 
for CRSV), and to some degree drive this continuing engagement, the level of activity 
has largely been driven by and involved a broad constituency of transnational civil 
society networks and UN entities such as UN Women.121 This activity across the UNSC, 
UN entities and civil society has generated a new locus and modality for issues of women 
and conflict that has not been seen before in respect to the UN system. It has proven 
remarkably productive of a whole new realm of activity dedicated exclusively to the 
implementation of the UNSC’s WPS agenda at international, regional and local levels,122 
quite apart from the UN organs formally mandated to pursue such issues under the 
Charter. 
While these developments evidence remarkable progress both normatively and 
procedurally, there remain pronounced concerns regarding the lack of meaningful 
accountability mechanisms for the implementation of the resolutions. Further, a number 
of critical tensions arise from engaging a body such as the UNSC to advance women’s 
rights in ways akin to that of the human rights regime. Ultimately, the politics of the 
UNSC’s mandate and its operative modalities determine limitations that give rise to 
practical deficits in accountability in a number of ways. The UNSC mandate also, 
however, offers a number of unique opportunities that could be more fully maximized. 
Both the limitations and opportunities are summarized here. 
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 In respect of limitations, firstly, it is important to recognise that the UNSC does 
not act as a monitoring body on state-level implementation of its resolutions or thematic 
issues. It is mandated to respond to threats to international peace and security and is not a 
legislative-like body.123 Rather, its resolutions are intended to be directed to specific 
member states with time-bound activities in order to redress particular threats.124 Other 
than the sui generis activities of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the UNSC lacks a 
mandate, function and means for holding member states accountable to its broad thematic 
resolutions. The UNSC instead requests that the UN Secretary-General update the UNSC 
on implementation of the WPS resolutions through the aforementioned thematic annual 
reports.125 It is Important to note that, while these reports are compiled on the basis of 
information provided by member states on implementation of the resolutions, state 
submissions to the reporting process are to the UN Secretary-General (not the UNSC) 
and cooperation with reporting is not mandatory for states. The reports are important 
informative outputs and offer significant observations on progress towards 
implementation. They are not, however, a modality through which member states are 
directly accounting to the UNSC for implementation of the resolutions.  
Secondly, the UNSC has not made full use of the accountability options available 
to it for its WPS agenda. The UNSC has the means to establish modes of accountability 
through its own working methods, such as through the establishment of committees and 
working groups to implement its thematic resolutions. To date, the UNSC has not shown 
any appetite for pursuing the option of creating a specific body, such as a working group, 
to advance accountability by member states for the WPS agenda. This gap further 
illuminates the accountability deficits attendant to this agenda item. By contrast with the 
WPS agenda, the UNSC established the Children and Armed Conflict working group in 
2005, through its thematic agenda item on children for example.126 The working group 
monitors country contexts and makes recommendations for actions to be taken by states, 
non-state actors, the UN system and other actors.127  
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 Thirdly, as the UNSC has failed to nominate mandatory measures for 
accountability for member state actions. Civil society actors have instead been to the 
forefront of proposing modes of accountability. Principal among these civil society 
activities has been the call for UN member states to adopt state-level National Action 
Plans (NAPs) on WPS to implement the resolutions through national policy.128 While the 
adoption of NAPs by member states has been encouraged by the Secretary-General since 
2002, and occasionally by Presidents of the UNSC,129 the UNSC itself has been slow to 
respond. Action plans were only formally recognized by the UNSC in an operational 
paragraph of resolution 2242 (2015). However, the resolution only ‘welcomes’ the 
adoption of NAPs to date and ‘encourages’ further implementation strategies at national 
levels.130 Such language is to be distinguished from clear language of obligation.131 While 
this encouragement can be considered progress, these moves do not require or mandate 
states to adopt action plans, nor will their quality, efficacy and implementation be 
monitored in any formal way. States, such as Russia, also contest the idea that action 
plans are a universal accountability tool and instead posit that they should only be 
developed by states on the agenda of the UNSC to which the resolutions, in their view, 
are relevant.132 To a variable degree, however, member states have responded to calls for 
NAPs. As of end of 2016, 63 states had adopted action plans on WPS.133 Civil society 
actors have filled in the gaps left by the UNSC’s lukewarm engagement, by supporting 
states to develop action plans. They—and scholars—have critiqued the quality and 
efficacy of NAPs,134 advocated for the application of the resolutions within both domestic 
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 and foreign policy135 and fulfilled a shadow role in monitoring the content and efficacy of 
these plans.136  
Fourthly, the UNSC’s primary response to criticism of the lack of enforcement 
measures within resolution 1325 (2000) has been to adopt subsequent WPS resolutions. 
The response has therefore tended to replicate, rather than resolve, the broader 
enforcement and accountability deficits that characterise resolution 1325. Moreover, the 
subsequent resolutions set out modalities that are primarily directed towards the UN 
system rather than member states. To illustrate, resolution 1889 (2009) provided 
provisions for implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), which included a request to the 
Secretary-General to develop a set of global indicators to track the implementation of the 
resolution. It was intended that both member states and UN entities would voluntarily 
report against the indicators through the aforementioned UN Secretary-General’s annual 
reports (with the majority of indicators aimed at the UN system). 137   Although the 
indicators were presented by the Secretary-General to the UNSC in 2010, some members 
of the UNSC have contested their relevance and declined requests to report against them. 
As such, the application of the indicators has been far from universal with UN agencies 
engaging with them much more than States.138  Resolution 1889 also proposed a strategy 
to increase the number of women in the UN system and to appoint gender and women’s 
protection advisers within UN operations.139  Building on these provisions, resolution 
2122 (2013) strengthened approaches to women’s participation and leadership throughout 
conflict prevention, peace processes and post-conflict reconstruction, and included 
requests for more frequent briefings on WPS to the UNSC by UN entities.140 Further, 
resolution 2422 (2015) addressed UN activities on countering violent extremism and 
terrorism and committed to integrating WPS concerns across all country-specific 
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 situations on its agenda.141 Despite this activity, grave concerns about implementation 
persist, in particular in the current accountability vacuum.142  
In tandem with its limitations, there are opportunities that the UNSC’s mandate 
offers in respect of unique entry points for the progression of women’s rights in conflict. 
Engagement by the UNSC on the issue of CRSV has been accompanied by more robust 
implementation measures that also focus on the UN system – as distinct from member 
states – activities. Resolution 1820 (2008), which formally introduced CRSV as a 
defining WPS issue, was quickly followed by resolution 1888 (2009) which established 
mechanisms for the earlier resolution’s implementation and enforcement. Mechanisms 
included the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary General to advance 
the UN’s work on addressing CRSV. 143  Importantly, the next CRSV resolution, 
resolution 1960 (2010), proposed a suite of mechanisms to advance accountability on this 
issue. These mechanisms included the establishment of a monitoring, analysis and 
reporting framework (MARA) that documents and tracks patterns of sexual violence.144 
This has effectively enabled the Secretary-General to submit to the UNSC a list of actors 
– primarily non-state actors – involved in sexual violence. Further, resolution 2106 
(2013) includes provisions for securing prosecutions for CRSV, which does address both 
state and non-state actors.145  
Of further significance is the UNSC’s power to impose sanctions, a distinct 
strength of the UNSC. While the General Assembly holds broad powers to make 
recommendations for actions relating to peace and security,146 it concedes authority on 
measures of enforcement on these matters to the UNSC.147 In this capacity, the UNSC 
has come to include human rights abuses in its sanctions criteria, with evidence of a 
growing relationship between the sanctions system and the UNSC’s own human rights-
related actors.148 The link between the WPS agenda and the sanctions committee was first 
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 made in resolution 1820 (2008) and reiterated in resolutions 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010), 
2106 (2013) and 2242 (2015). 149  The UNSC created a formal role for the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict who now 
regularly briefs the sanctions committee. The mandate of the Special Representative 
extends to naming and proposing individuals or entities to be sanctioned by the UNSC.150  
To date, the UNSC has included sexual violence as a criterion in over half of its 
sanctions regimes.151 Sanctions regimes are only invoked, however, where there is a 
distinct threat to the peace and where other measures have failed. It is thereby distinctly 
and solely tied to the UNSC’s definition of ‘sexual violence, when used or commissioned 
as a tactic of war’, and to the small number of country situations on the agenda of the 
UNSC.152  While this offers significant progress in respect to enforcement of standards of 
protection of women’s rights, the potential to use sanctions to enforce decisions of the 
UNSC regarding WPS are thereby restricted to incidents that reach a certain threshold 
and that are within the agenda of the UNSC.  There have been attempts, notably by the 
first Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
through the Secretary-General’s annual report, to expand coverage to wider forms of 
harm and ranges of contexts as relevant to the application of the UNSC resolutions. This 
attempt was met with rebuttal by some member states and the lines re-drawn to those 
specific to the UNSC’s agenda.153 
Also significant in terms of unique opportunities offered by the UNSC is its 
distinctive role in making decisions on peacekeeping and political missions that are under 
its singular authority. The UN system’s work has progressively shifted from the poverty 
focus of the 1990s to a security-driven agenda over which the UNSC has significant 
control.154  Currently, the UN’s largest budget is attached to its security agenda and 
specifically to its peacekeeping operations. For fiscal year 2015-2016, these operations 
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 were budgeted at USD$8.27billion.155 These are directly mandated by the UNSC. It is 
thereby the most significant body with the means to advance commitments to women’s 
rights through these operations. Most recently, as the issue of sexual exploitation and 
abuse has arisen in these operations, the UNSC is the principal body with the power to 
establish provisions to prevent and respond to this issue (which it did in 2016).156 The 
UNSC can enforce legal requirements on women’s rights through its missions by more 
stringent attention to, and accountability on, sexual exploitation and abuse.  
The UNSC also has the power to adopt resolutions that stipulate actions and 
responses to specific country contexts. The need for state and non-state actors to prevent 
and address sexual violence in specific contexts has been included in resolutions as early 
as the 1990s, in response to events in the former Yugoslavia, and more recently in 
resolutions on contexts such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo.157  Referrals to 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) are within the UNSC’s realm,158 and as such 
referrals could potentially advance accountability for violations of women’s rights in 
conflict. Neither of the first two such referrals explicitly included either reference to 
sexual or gender-based crimes. 159  However, Resolution 1593 (2005) which referred 
Darfur to the ICC cites the report of the Darfur Commission of Inquiry.160 That report 
found that sexual violence took place as part of ‘indiscriminate attacks…conducted on a 
widespread and systematic basis’ by government forces and militia.161   The ensuing 
investigation and warrants for arrest by the Prosecutor have included charges of rape, 162 
demonstrating the potential that such referrals from the UNSC may have in advancing 
accountability for violations of women’s rights in conflict. This potential appears 
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 diminished, however, with the decreasing appetite of the UNSC for referrals to the ICC 
given the Kenya situation in 2013.163 
While the WPS resolutions all prescribe a range of duties for UN member states, 
deeper scrutiny reveals that the accountability measures described are primarily focused 
on the UN system and entities and actors related to the UNSC (such as the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations). There are few provisions that mandate member state action 
per se. The WPS resolutions have been accompanied by measures towards the collection 
of country-level data on specific elements of women’s rights in conflict, yet an overall 
system of obligation and state accountability has, to date, not emerged. This failure 
reflects both essential institutional aspects of the UNSC and broader deficiencies of 
political will. Where the WPS resolutions have offered greater promise in terms of 
accountability is in respect of relevant UN programmatic activity, sanctions, ICC 
referrals and peacekeeping.  
 
IV. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CEDAW AND THE UNSC ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN 
CONFLICT SETTINGS 
A. Thematic Interactions (and Boundaries) on Women’s Rights in Conflict 
In comparing the thematic focus of activity between the CEDAW Committee and the 
UNSC, the significance of a structural understanding of gender and conflict becomes 
evident. While both institutions share some common thematic concerns—such as conflict 
prevention, gender-based violence and women’s participation in peacebuilding—the 
Convention and GR30 go beyond the WPS resolutions in several critical respects.164 The 
WPS agenda, for example, does not address trafficking, nationality and statelessness, or 
marriage and family relations, yet these are specifically addressed in the Convention and 
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 GR30.165 Differences are not just evident in the themes addressed; they are perhaps even 
more pronounced in the approach adopted. In GR19, GR30 and throughout its activities, 
the CEDAW Committee has advanced an understanding of gender-based violence as both 
a cause and consequence of historically unequal relations between men and women.166 
When addressing the specifics of conflict-related violence, therefore, the Committee 
understands and articulates the relationship of conflict-related violence to gender-based 
violence that precedes and survives the end of conflict.167  Moreover, the Committee 
situates such violence within the broader exacerbating effects of conflict on gender 
inequality and women’s vulnerabilities to all forms of violence.168  
This approach contrasts in dramatic and meaningful ways with the WPS 
resolutions’ focus on ‘sexual violence when used or commissioned as a tactic of war to 
deliberately target civilians or as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian 
populations’. 169  Differences are further evident in approaches to perhaps the most 
fundamental gender issue in conflict: its prevention. Whereas the WPS resolutions 
advocate the increased participation of women in conflict prevention,170 the CEDAW 
Committee advocates conflict prevention per se in order to address the causes of conflict, 
for example by calling on state parties to robustly regulate the arms trade and to 
appropriately control the circulation of conventional and small arms.171  
Thematically, challenges remain in respect of moving the WPS agenda beyond 
instrumentalised and securitised approaches to women’s inclusion, towards advancing the 
rights and equality end of this initial engagement in substantive ways. A relationship with 
the Convention, as the pivotal legal instrument on women’s rights, does however provide 
a paradigm of non-discrimination and substantive equality under which the WPS agenda 
could and should advance women’s rights and accountability. This potential has been 
furthered through GR30. It has effectively brought the two systems of accountability and 
thematic activity on gender and conflict into conversation with one another and addressed 
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 the specifics of their relationships, thereby signalling the realignment of the WPS and 
broader international women’s rights agendas. Whether and how their shared concern for 
thematic areas of interest, and for accountability on the same, is taken forward from this 
point will largely determine whether fragmentation across the regimes is entrenched, or 
the opportunity for enhanced synergy maximized, for common advancement of women’s 
rights in conflict and peacebuilding. In light of the clear functional and thematic strengths 
of the CEDAW Committee and the UNSC’s activities on women’s rights in conflict, it is 
critical to consider how both institutions interact in the pursuit of maximum 
accountability and complementarity. 
 
B. Current Institutional Interactions between the CEDAW Committee and the UNSC 
In broad terms, it is clear that the CEDAW Committee is more open to productive 
interactions with the UNSC and its WPS agenda than vice versa. GR30 specifically 
addresses the relationship of the Convention to the WPS resolutions, substantively, in 
terms of the importance of implementing the resolutions in order to comply with state 
obligations under the Convention and, procedurally, in terms of the obligations on states 
to report on their WPS activities in their periodic reporting to the CEDAW Committee.172  
GR30 further addresses the territorial application of the Convention—to state party 
activities within their borders, but also in bilateral relations with neighbouring states, in 
donor activities and foreign affairs, and in multilateral memberships of UN and regional 
organisations. 173  As such, GR30 not only addresses states currently or recently in 
conflict, but rather addresses all state parties. It reflects a longer-term body of work by 
the Committee to bring domestic implementation of the resolutions under its purview and 
within the Convention’s formal mechanisms of state accountability.174 The substance of 
GR30, in particular through the express integration of the WPS resolutions and 
framework, has the evident potential to advance a new era of accountability for women’s 
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 rights in conflict, while also ensuring that the WPS agenda remains firmly conceptualised 
within a broader women’s rights and equality agenda.  
Even prior to its adoption of GR30, the CEDAW Committee engaged in some 
monitoring of state party activity on resolution 1325. In particular, the Committee has 
scrutinized state party adoption of National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS. 175  The 
Committee has fostered the adoption of NAPs by commending state parties that have 
done so,176 and encouraging other state parties to do likewise.177 Further, the Committee 
has scrutinised their content178 and implementation.179 In addition to its scrutiny of NAP 
adoption, content and implementation, the Committee has also framed its 
recommendations to state parties on conflict-specific issues as constitutive of their 
implementation of resolution 1325 (2000). 180  It is noteworthy that the Committee’s 
scrutiny of state party activity on WPS extends to both conflict-affected countries and 
donor countries.  
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 GR30 responds both to concerns about the legal status and under-enforcement of 
UNSC resolution 1325 and to the fragmentation of international law norms for gender 
equality.181 GR30 is inter alia an effort to give retrospective legal status to the UNSC 
resolution 1325 and its successors. (Notably, GR30 characterizes the resolutions as 
‘crucial political frameworks’182). The recommendation characterises implementation of 
the WPS resolutions as part of state party implementing obligations under the 
Convention, ‘as all areas of concern addressed in those resolutions find expression in the 
substantive provisions of the Convention’.183 In addition to retrospective legal status, the 
intervention by the Committee formally brings the domestic implementation of the 
resolutions into the purview of the monitoring role of the Committee: 
States parties are to provide information on the implementation of the Security 
Council agenda on women, peace and security, in particular resolutions 1325 
(2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013), including by 
specifically reporting on compliance with any agreed United Nations benchmarks 
or indicators developed as part of that agenda.184 
 
Given timelines, there is a necessarily short period to review practice, but certain 
trends can be identified to date. First and foremost, it is clear that the Committee is 
prioritizing women’s participation in peace processes and transitional justice processes in 
its monitoring of state activities. Given that this issue of participation is one of the four 
priority pillars of the WPS resolutions, it is noteworthy that it is the Committee, rather 
than the UNSC, that is pursuing meaningful accountability in this regard. The priority 
given by the Committee to women’s participation is best illustrated by the selection of 
this issue for ‘follow-up’ by the Committee in Georgia, 185  the Central African 
Republic,186 Iraq187 and Syria.188 Further, NAPs continue to be an area of scrutiny.189 As 
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 specified in GR30, the Concluding Observations address issues around statelessness,190 
and employment and economic opportunities affected by conflict.191 Of particular interest 
are the Committee’s Concluding Observations to Syria in 2014, which deal almost 
exclusively with conflict-related challenges to women’s human rights. The Committee 
draws heavily on GR30 to that end. It importantly draws attention to shortcomings 
beyond the state party, specifically around donor funding to the country 192  and the 
conduct of non-state armed actors.193 To quote the Global Study on the Implementation 
of Resolution 1325 (2000), the Concluding Observations to Syria are a ‘model for the 
engagement of civil society with human rights mechanisms on the WPS agenda’.194  
From the perspective of the UNSC, by contrast, the potential for any synergy 
between its work and that of the human rights system has, thus far, been tentative. The 
WPS agenda and the wider thematic and routine work of the UNSC has continued to 
develop almost in isolation from obligations on women’s rights and human rights in the 
wider UN system.  Procedurally, this has meant little crossover in terms of accountability 
in respect of the UNSC itself with procedural human rights mechanisms (such as the 
CEDAW Committee). 
While the UNSC does reference broader normative and human rights instruments 
of the UN system in its resolutions, actual substantive engagement with the Convention 
has been sparse. Research undertaken for this article found that, between November 1st 
2000 (after the adoption of resolution 1325) and March 1, 2016, the UNSC adopted 947 
resolutions. Of these, 10 mention the Convention, six of which are WPS resolutions.195 
Noteworthy is that the Convention is not referenced consistently in all of the WPS 
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 resolutions; it is even less consistent in the resolutions on CRSV. The Convention is cited 
in the operational paragraphs of resolution 1325 (2000) and resolution 2250 (2015), 
wherein states parties and parties to armed conflict are called upon to comply with 
applicable obligations under the Convention. It is further cited in resolution 2145 (2014) 
and resolution 2210 (2015) where duplicate requests are made to the UN mission in 
Afghanistan to continue support to that states’ compliance to the Convention. Otherwise, 
where the Convention is mentioned, it appears in the preambular paragraphs, which are 
considered by some as a ‘dumping ground’ for proposals not acceptable in the operative 
paragraphs.196  It appears that, despite the apparent success in bringing feminism and 
women’s rights concerns to the heart of the UNSC, the UNSC has nevertheless managed 
to compartmentalise its work on women, peace and security. This has led to fragmented 
approaches to supposedly universal guarantees of women’s rights. It also poses important 
questions for the broader transformative demands that underpinned initial feminist civil 
society entry into the UNSC.197  
 
C. Proposed Institutional Interactions between CEDAW and the UNSC 
One of the key conclusions of the UNSC-mandated 2015 Global Study on the 
Implementation of Resolution 1325 was the need for improved synergies between 
international human rights mechanisms and the UNSC’s WPS agenda. 198   With the 
adoption of GR30, the CEDAW Committee has provided practical guidance and a 
normative framework to that end.199 Against a backdrop of increasingly vocal concern 
about the form and substance of accountability mechanisms attendant to the WPS 
agenda, 200  the international system for the protection of human rights has garnered 
renewed attention in efforts to enhance accountability for women’s rights in conflict. If 
the potential for synergies is to be maximised, complementarity across the regimes (both 
substantively and procedurally) is required going forward. We outline some of the 
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 opportunities that exist in this respect. We do so with the caveat understanding that the 
mandates of each regime will determine and delimit their modal engagement. In addition, 
the political will of actors involved, particularly on the part of some UNSC permanent 
members who are resistant to connectivity with other UN institutional regimes, is likely 
to be the most critical factor in any success herein. Practically speaking, there are ways 
that the activity of each regime can be engaged with, shared and used to influence 
progress on women’s rights in conflict by both regimes. These relate, principally, to the 
sharing of data, the pursuit of state-level accountability from both parties and non-parties 
to the CEDAW Convention, and the greater integration of women’s human rights in the 
UNSC’s interpretation of its mandate.  
Firstly, the data gathered by the CEDAW Committee through periodic and 
exceptional state party reports, civil society shadow reports and the Committee dialogue 
with state parties provide data that is of use to the UNSC as it makes decisions on 
situations on its agenda. The UNSC can rely on that data and demonstrate its willingness 
to make use of, and reference, that work in its own working methods. The Informal 
Experts Group of the UNSC established under resolution 2242 (2015) has already made 
use of reports by the CEDAW Committee in its briefing on Mali for example.201 This 
mechanism facilitates briefings to the UNSC about situations on its agenda that are 
delivered by experts and civil society organisations. This mechanism could also include 
the outputs of CEDAW state party monitoring activities. This is a particular opportunity 
for civil society, a constituency with considerably fewer opportunities for formal 
engagement with the UNSC than the CEDAW Committee, to have their insights and 
outputs considered. Likewise, the reports of peacekeeping missions and the UN 
Secretary-General’s annual report on this issue could be shared with the CEDAW 
Committee, reinforcing joint reporting, data-sharing and approaches to addressing sexual 
exploitation within the UN system by both institutions. The opportunities that exist for 
enhanced data-sharing in the pursuit of improved overall accountability for women’s 
rights in conflict are considerable.  
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 Secondly, the CEDAW Committee and the UNSC offer distinctive opportunities 
in respect of state-level accountability for women’s rights in conflict, due to differing 
institutional mandates and areas of authority. These opportunities can be maximized to 
common ends. The CEDAW Committee, for example, lends the non-discrimination and 
transformative end of women’s rights provision to the overall agenda of the protection 
and advancement of women’s rights in conflict and peacebuilding. Through its 
monitoring activities, the Committee can make recommendations that drive state-level 
implementation of WPS resolutions towards substantive equality and human rights for 
women. In addition, the CEDAW Committee drives accountability for WPS on states that 
are not experiencing conflict, but in line with GR30, have extra-territorial responsibilities 
in respect of thematic areas of WPS.202 Importantly, even member states that have thus 
far declined to report to the Secretary-General on WPS, and/or have not adopted NAPs, 
may still be held to account for their WPS commitments by the CEDAW Committee. 
Likewise, the UNSC can –through the Secretary-General’s annual reporting on WPS – 
play a role in enhancing the state-level accountability of UN member states that are not 
party to the Convention, or rely on reservations to the Convention in order to avoid more 
substantive obligations concerning women’s rights in conflict. 
Thirdly, the UNSC can maximize the potential of its own areas of authority, by 
more comprehensively integrating women’s human rights in the interpretation of its 
mandate. For example, a High-Level Review of the UNSC’s sanctions regime in 2014 
made specific recommendations for expanded sanctions criteria that would allow 
thematic areas of concern to be considered as ‘threats’ under the UNSC’s mandate in 
respect of sanctions. This included a recommendation that the UNSC ‘should use existing 
sanctions regimes more effectively to enforce thematic priorities, including…the Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda[s].’203 A further recommendation was made to adopt thematic 
sanctions regimes that would include not only sexual violence (which has been its only 
focus to date as noted before) but also significantly ‘gross violations of women’s 
rights’.204 Whether and how women’s rights violations reach the threshold of ‘threat’ to 
international peace and security remains to be seen. The sanctions committee can, for 
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 example, make use of states parties reports and concluding observations of the CEDAW 
Committee, drawing in data from the CEDAW Committee in order to inform its 
decisions-making.  
Divergent approaches and accountability mechanisms not only counter the 
potential of these provisions, but they also entrench the challenges that both bodies of 
instruments face. Pursuing the complementary operation and implementation of both 
regimes is critical. In a world of changing modalities and conceptualisations of armed 
conflict and terrorism, there is more than ample impetus to work with and through the 
historical divisions across the UN systems.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
While a specifically ‘feminist’ position on fragmentation in international law is unlikely, 
sustained consideration of the practical institutional implications of overlapping gender 
equality norm development is a critical area of inquiry. This article has sought to 
investigate the overlapping thematic activity on women’s rights in conflict, but also to 
offer a methodology for similar investigations in other thematic areas of relevance. The 
feminist project in international law has always been one of both process and 
substance.205 Thus we conclude with some reflections on the optimum forward trajectory 
of the institutional interactions between the CEDAW Committee, as an institution of 
human rights law, and the UNSC, by advocating processes of both cross-regime dialogue 
and inter-regime accountability. We believe these reflections have relevance for those 
concerned with fragmentation in international law and for those concerned with the 
efficacy of gender equality norm development under international law.  
The adoption of concurrent provisions on women and conflict by both the 
CEDAW Committee and the UNSC has brought these two entities into direct 
conversation with each other, albeit from different legal, normative and mandate-driven 
standpoints. The CEDAW Committee, through GR30, has provided guidance to states on 
their obligations to women’s rights in settings of conflict and peacebuilding. The WPS 
resolutions have ensured that the UNSC is engaged in institutional activity regarding 
women’s rights within its mandate, such as using its specific powers to address issues 
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 like CRSV through its sanctions regime. For both regimes, it is evident that moving 
forward on modalities for the practical enforcement and implementation of the concerns 
and rights of women in conflict cannot be advanced in isolation from the other. Here we 
see an important role for cross-regime dialogue.  
Cross-regime dialogue should also be seen, however, as a means to advance an 
ongoing process of inter-regime accountability, in which each seeks to hold the other to 
account for its activities on women’s rights in conflict. In the increasingly complex 
terrain of international law, proposals for regime interaction need to be contextual and 
institution-specific, and judged with respect to the democracy, transparency and openness 
of the respective institutions. Proposals that maximise accountability (broadly 
understood) will also contribute to legitimacy. This is something that should motivate 
both regimes. Rather than seeing the differences in mandate and focus as obstacles to the 
advancement of women’s rights, it is important to recognise the value in tensions 
between the security-focus of the UNSC and the feminist and rights-based approach of 
the CEDAW Committee.  
Consider for example, the Arria Formula meeting between the UNSC and 
CEDAW Committee, the very first such meeting between the UNSC and a treaty-based 
human rights monitoring committee of the UN system.206 The meeting was held in public 
and was thus strong on transparency. It constituted an opportunity for the UNSC member 
states to probe and challenge the CEDAW Committee’s interpretation of the WPS 
resolutions, as well as the binding nature of the CEDAW Committee’s interpretative 
activities, such as developing general recommendations. 207  Likewise, the CEDAW 
Committee challenged UNSC member states to implement their human rights obligations 
through their UNSC membership, and to avoid treating the two as discrete activities.208 
More routinely, the CEDAW Committee retains the opportunity to review and challenge 
the substance and scope of WPS activities of CEDAW state parties and UN country 
offices through periodic state examination, which it has shown great willingness to do. 
Similarly, in his 2016 Annual Report to the UNSC on Women, Peace and Security, the 
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 Secretary-General made specific recommendations to the CEDAW Committee about how 
they might advance implementation of the WPS agenda.209 We see – in these spaces of 
challenge, tension and contestation – the opportunity for the respective regimes to 
advance a continual process of constructive cross-regime dialogue and inter-regime 
accountability.  
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